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WATKINS v. UNITED STATES ARMY: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT FORCES THE ARMY OUT 
OF THE CLOSET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Watkins v. United States Army,! a sharply divided 11 
member en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit equitably estopped 
the Army from denying reenlistment to Sergeant Perry J. Wat-
kins.2 This was the third time in seven years that the case came 
before the Ninth Circuit.8 The Ninth Circuit withdrew both of 
its previous opinions and reinstated an order that it had re-
ver~sed in 1983.4 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's first decision in 
1. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (per 
Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, C.J., Schroeder, J., Alarcon, J., 
Nelson, J., Canby, J., concurring, Norris, J., concurring in the judgment, Beezer, J., Hall, 
J., dissenting, O'Scannlain, J., and Trott, J.). 
2. Id. at 704-05. 
3. See Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983) (equity powers 
of the federal courts cannot be exercised to order military officials to violate their own 
regulations absent a determination that those regulations violate the Constitution or the 
military's statutory authority); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Army's reenlistment regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by discrimi-
nating against persons of homosexual orientation, a suspect class, without promoting a 
legitimate compelling government interest). 
4. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711. The majority noted that the law of the case doctrine 
did not prevent it from reconsidering issues raised in the earlier panel decisions of the 
case. See e.g. Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 744 
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the case, hereinafter called Watkins I, a majority ruled that 
Watkins' equitable estoppel claim was justiciable.1I Reaching the 
merits of the claim, the majority held that the Army had effec-
tively waived its right to deny reenlistment to Watkins on 
grounds that his reenlistment would violate an Army regulation 
barring the reenlistment of gays and lesbians.s Contrary to the 
Ninth Circuit's second decision in the case, hereinafter called 
Watkins II, the majority concluded that it was unnecessary to 
reach the difficult constitutional issue of whether to apply strict, 
intermediate or rational level scrutiny to government classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation.7 The Ninth Circuit's decision 
illustrates that under extraordinary circumstances a federal 
court can and will exercise its equity powers to order the mili-
tary to violate its own regulations.s 
II. FACTS 
In 1967, at the age of 19, Perry J. Watkins was drafted and 
admitted into the United States Army, despite the Army's long-
impair the power of an en banc court to overrule any panel decision."), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1215 (1985); Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 436-37 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1978) (en 
banc) (law of the case doctrine cannot immunize panel decisions from review by the 
court en banc), aff'd, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); cf. United States v. Mills, 810 F.2d 907, 909 
(9th Cir. 1987) (law of the case is a discretionary doctrine), cert. denied, 180 S.Ct. 107 
(1987). 
5. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 706. 
6. Id. at 711. 
7. Id. at 705. However, two of the seven judges in the majority wrote separately and 
urged that the court should have reached Watkins' constitutional claim. Judge Norris 
wrote that he believed Watkins' equitable estoppel claim was barred by precedent, but 
he concurred in the judgment because he also believed that Watkins had prevailed on his 
equal protection claim. Id. at 711 (Norris, J., concurring in judgment). Judge Canby 
wrote that the court should have reached Watkins' constitutional claim even though 
Watkins had prevailed on his equitable estoppel claim. See id. at 731 (Canby, J., 
concurring). 
The dissent, written by Judge Hall and joined by three other judges, sharply dis-
agreed with the majority's refusal to reach Watkins' constitutional claim. See id. at 731 
(Hall, J., dissenting). "The en banc majority shies away from this issue .... " Id. "The 
majority's steadfast desire to avoid constitutional adjudication does not support its de-
struction of a valuable justiciability doctrine." Id. at 736. "The majority's desire to avoid 
the difficult equal protection question presented in this case is no reason to dispense 
with well-established case law." Id. at 737. 
Thus, actually a six to five majority of the court (the four dissenting judges plus 
Judges Norris and Canby) agreed that Watkins' constitutional claim should have been 
addressed. However, Judge Norris was the only judge who wrote an opinion on Watkins' 
constitutional claim and Judge Canby was the only judge who joined. 
8. See infra notes 83 - 109 and accompanying text. 
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standing "non-waivable" policy of excluding all gays and lesbi-
ans from service.9 About one year later, the Army conducted a 
criminal investigation into Watkins' sexual conduct, during 
which Watkins signed an affidavit stating that he had been gay 
from the age of 13 and that, since his enlistment, he had en-
gaged in sodomy with two other servicemen.1o The Army subse-
quently dropped the investigation because of insufficient evi-
dence. ll In 1961, the Army accepted Watkins' application for a 
second three-year term.12 
In 1972, the Army again investigated Watkins for allegedly 
committing sodomy and, for the second time, terminated the in-
vestigation for insufficient evidence.13 The Army honorably dis-
charged Watkins in 1974 and immediately accepted his applica-
tion for a six-year reenlistment. 14 In 1975, the Army convened a 
board of four officers to determine whether Watkins should be 
discharged because of his homosexual tendencies. 1G The Secre-
tary of the Army adopted the board's unanimous recommenda-
tion to retain Watkins. 16 
9. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 701. The Army's preinduction medical form required Wat-
kins to indicate whether he had homosexual tendencies. Watkins answered in the affirm-
ative. [d. Watkins served as a chaplain's assistant, personnel specialist and company 
clerk during his initial three-year tour of duty in the United States and Korea. [d. 
10. [d. Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes it a crime for a 
serviceperson to engage "in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same 
or opposite sex." 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976). This language has been held to outlaw both 
heterosexual and homosexual oral and anal intercourse, even if it occurs in the privacy of 
a bedroom, where both persons have meaningfully consented and neither has used force 
or money to coerce the other. See United States v. Morgan, Jr., 8 C.M.A. 341 (1957) 
(consensual as well as nonconsensual sodomy is included within 10 U.S.C.S. § 925); 
United States v. Jones, 14 M.J. 1008 (CMR 1982) (10 U.S.C.S. § 925 is constitutional as 
applied to private sodomy between consenting adults of different sex). 
11. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 701-02. 
12. [d. at 702. Watkins received an honorable discharge in 1970. [d. His reenlist-
ment eligibility code was listed as "unknown." [d. Watkins requested clarification of his 
reenlistment eligibility code in 1971. [d. The Army changed the code to category 1, "eli-
gible for reentry on active duty." [d. 
13. [d. The investigation followed the Army's denial of Watkins' application for a 
security clearance. [d. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. 
16. [d. Watkins' commanding officer and a sergeant testified that Watkins did "a 
fantastic job" and that Watkins' well known homosexuality did not affect the company. 
[d. The board recommended that the Army retain Watkins because "there is no evidence 
suggesting that his behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance, 
morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance." Id. 
3
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In November 1977, the Army granted Watkins a security 
clearance.17 Watkins worked without incident until he publicly 
disclosed his sexual orientation in an interview on March 15, 
1979.18 This prompted another Army investigation. IS While the 
investigation was pending, the Army accepted Watkins' applica-
tion for a three-year reenlistment.2o In July 1980, the Army re-
voked Watkins' security clearance. U 
In August 1981, Watkins filed suit against the Army in Fed-
eral District Court.22 On October 5, 1982, the district court en-
joined the Army from refusing to reenlist Watkins because of his 
sexual orientation.23 The court held that the Army was equitably 
estopped from relying on its longstanding policy of disqualifying 
17. [d. However, the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability Program initially rejected 
Watkins' application for a position. [d. Watkins' commanding officer subsequently re-
quested that Watkins be requalified for a position in the program, stating that Watkins 
was highly trusted and respected among peers, superiors and subordinates. [d. Based on 
the request of Watkins' commanding officer and an examining Army physician's conclu-
sion that Watkins' sexual orientation did not cause him problems in his work, Watkins 




21. [d. The Army based its decision on Watkins' March 1979 admission of homosex-
uality, medical records containing his 1968 affidavit stating that he had engaged in ho-
mosexual conduct, and his history of performing (with the permission of his commanding 
officer) as a female impersonator in various revues. [d. 
22. [d. at 703. Watkins' suit originally sought only to have his security clearance 
reinstated. [d. at 703, n. 3. In 1981, the Army promulgated a new regulation which man-
dated the discharge of all gays and lesbians from service, regardless of merit. [d. at 702. 
The new regulation also clarified the Army's longstanding policy of disqualifying all gays 
and lesbians from reenlistment. See id. at 703 n. 5. See also AR 635-200, chpt. 15 (man-
dating discharge of all homosexuals, regardless of merit); AR 601-280, § 2-21(c) (disquali-
fying all homosexuals from reenlistment). 
Pursuant to the new regulation, the Army convened discharge proceedings against 
Watkins. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 702. Watkins amended his complaint to enjoin the Army 
from discharging him on the basis of his sexual orientation. [d. at 703 n. 3. The Army 
board rejected evidence that Watkins had engaged in homosexual conduct after 1968, 
but recommended discharging Watkins anyway because "he has stated that he is a ho-
mosexual." [d. at 702-03. In May 1982, the Army Secretary adopted the board's recom-
mendation. [d. Before the Army discharged Watkins, however, the district court ruled 
that the Army's double jeopardy provision barred it from discharging Watkins on the 
basis of his stating that he was homosexual and that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding that he had engaged in homosexual conduct subsequent to the 1975 
discharge proceedings. [d. at 703 n. 4. 
The Army allowed Watkins to complete his current tour of duty, which expired in 
October 1982. [d. The Army rejected Watkins' application for reenlistment, citing its 
longstanding policy of disqualifying gays and lesbians from reenlistment. [d. 
23. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 703. 
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gays and lesbians from service to deny Watkins' application for 
reenlistment.24 The Army appealed the decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.2G 
In Watkins I, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district 
court's injunction, reasoning that the equity powers of the fed-
eral courts could not be exercised to order military officials to 
violate their own regulations, absent a determination that the 
regulations violated the Federal Constitution or the military's 
statutory authority.26 On remand, the district court held that 
the Army's regulations did not violate the Constitution or the 
Army's statutory authority.27 Watkins appealed.28 In Watkins 
II, a different Ninth Circuit panel held that the Army's reenlis-
ment regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause because 
they discriminate against gays and lesbians, a suspect class.29 
The Army petitioned for an en bane rehearing.30 The full court 
granted review to address the issues raised in Watkins I and 
Watkins II.31 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
A plaintiff attempting to sue a federal agency or officer must 
first demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction 
(because the suit is authorized by a specific federal statute) and 
that the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity.32 Even if sub-
24. Id. Accordingly, the Army reenlisted Watkins for a six-year term on November 
1, 1982, on condition that the reenlistment would be voided if the district court's injunc-
tion were not upheld on appeal. Id. at 703. 
While the Army's appeal of the district court injunction was pending, Watkins' 
superiors rated his performance and professionalism, giving Watkins perfect scores in 
every category and writing that Watkins' potential is "unlimited" and that Watkins 
should be promoted "at the earliest opportunity." Id. at 703-04. 
25. Id. at 704. 
26. Id. (citing Watkins I, 721 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
27.Id. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. (citing Watkins II, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
30.Id. 
31. Id. (citing Watkins II, 847 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
32. See 14 Wright, Miller & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3655 
(1985). The Tucker Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Administrative Procedure 
Act provide the major exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. For a gen-
eral discussion of jurisdiction over actions against the United States, see §§ 3654 - 3660. 
5
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ject matter jurisdiction exists, the concept of justiciability forces 
federal courts to decline their jurisdiction to hear certain 
claims.33 Justiciability plays a crucial role in determining 
whether a court will hear a particular claim against the military; 
"[f]ederal courts restrict their review of military decision-mak-
ing not because they lack jurisdictional power to hear military 
disputes, but out of deference to the special function of the mili-
tary in our constitutional structure and in the system of national 
defense. "34 
In Watkins, the Army did not dispute the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction or assert sovereign immunity as a defense.35 
Instead, it focused its defense on the justiciability issue, arguing 
that, under Mindes v. Seaman,36 the court must decline to hear 
Watkins' equitable estoppel claim.37 Watkins argued that 
Mindes did not apply and that, under Wagner v. Director, Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency,38 he was entitled to equi-
table estoppe1.39 Watkins was the first case analyzing whether 
Mindes bars all non constitutional equitable claims against the 
33. ':Justiciability is an analytical approach that has been 'developed to identify ap-
propriate occasions for judicial action, both as a matter of defining the limits of the 
judicial power created by Article III of the Constitution, and as a matter of justifying 
refusals to exercise the power even in cases within the reach of Article IlL' " Malamud v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 at 146 (1975)). "An all purpose definition of 
justiciability has never been published because of the 'notorious difficulty' of defining the 
concept." Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1085 n. 34 (11th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1600 (1984). See generally 13, 13A Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3529 - 3537 (1984). 
34. Sebra v. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Khalsa v. Wein-
berger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395-97 (9th Cir. 1985), judgment aff'd, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 
1985)). "[T]he doctrine of limited reviewability of certain military regulations and deci-
sions is a matter of justiciability, analagous to the political questions doctrine." Khalsa v. 
Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985), judgment aff'd, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
35. See supra note 3. See also Watkins v. United States Army, 541 F.Supp. 249, 257 
(1982) (voiding Army ruling discharging Watkins on grounds that it "was arbitrary, un-
supported by substantial evidence and contrary to law"); Watkins v. United States 
Army, 551 F.Supp. 212 (1982) (estopping Army from relying on regulation that bars 
reenlistment of gays and lesbians as grounds for denying reenlistment to Watkins). 
36. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971) (Air Force captain alleged that Air Force's decision 
to transfer him from active to reserve duty violated his right to procedural due process). 
37. See infra notes 40 - 65 and accompanying text. 
38. 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988) (insureds sought review of federal insurance 
agency's denial of insureds' claims for damage to their home caused by flood induced by 
landslide) . 
39. See infra notes 66 - 82 and accompanying text. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/5
1990] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 
military and, if not, whether Wagner governs some such claims. 
1. The Mindes Test 
In 1950, the Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States40 
that the government has no Federal Tort Claims Act liability for 
injuries to military service members arising in the course of mili-
tary service.41 The Court has not retreated from this position; in 
fact, a series of cases actually expanded upon it.42 The Court has 
recently stated that Feres bars tort claims against the military 
because these are the "type of claims that, if generally permit-
ted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at 
the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."43 
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Fed. Narcotics Agents,44 that a person may redress federal 
agents' constitutional violations of his rights by filing an action 
under federal constitutional law seeking money damages}1I Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens and the majority in 
40. 340 u.s. 135 (1950) (widow of soldier who was killed when a defective heating 
plant caused his barracks to catch fire brought wrongful death action against Army). 
41. [d. 
42. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,162 (1963) (federal prisoner sued 
under the Federal Torts Claim Act to recover damages for personal injuries sustained 
during confinement in a federal prison). In distinguishing the Feres case and allowing a 
federal prisoner to maintain an action against prison officials, the Court in Muniz stated 
that "Feres seems to be best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship of the 
soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline .. 
. .''') (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). The Court recently 
expanded the scope of Feres to preclude tort actions by military service members who 
were injured in the course of service by the action of a civilian government employee. 
See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (widow of coast guard helicopter pilot 
brought wrongful death action against United States alleging that civilian air traffic con-
troller's negligence caused the helicopter crash that killed her husband). 
43. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (mother of Army private 
brought wrongful death action against Army alleging that it had negligently failed to 
warn her son that the serviceman who kidnapped and murdered him had been previously 
convicted of murder and manslaughter). Likewise, the Court in Johnson concluded that 
the mere pendency of a suit against the government by a service member "could under-
mine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt 
military discipline in the broadest sense of the word." United States v. Johnson, 107 
S.Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987). 
44. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (plaintiff sued Federal Bureau of Narcotics for damages re-
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Butz v. Economou,46 reasoned that injunctive or declaratory re-
lief is useless in most instances of constitutional violations be-
cause the plaintiff has already been injured.47 "'For people in 
[those] shoes, it is damages or nothing.' "46 The Court in Butz 
concluded that "[t]he extension of absolute immunity from 
damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously 
erode the protection provided by basic constitutional 
guarantees. "49 
Although the Supreme Court subsequently applied the 
Feres rationale to bar Bivens-type damages claims against the 
military,IIO federal courts have never granted military officials ab-
solute immunity from claims seeking only declaratory and in-
junctive relief. III In 1971, the Fifth Circuit articulated the 
Mindes test for determining whether the federal court could re-
view a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against the mil-
itary.1I2 According to the first prong of the Mindes test, the 
plaintiff must establish that he has properly alleged that the 
military's action either deprived him of a federal constitutional 
right or violated a military statute or regulation and that he has 
exhausted all available intraservice remedies.1I3 Assuming the 
claim survives this preliminary analysis, Mindes requires the 
court to consider the nature and strength of the plaintiff's claim, 
the potential injury to him if review is refused, the type and de-
gree of anticipated interference with the military function if re-
view is granted and the level of military expertise and discretion 
involved.1I4 
Except for 'the Third Circuit, which rejected the Mindes 
test because "it intertwines the concept of justiciability with the 
standards to be applied to the merits of the case,"1I1I all the cir-
46. 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (action for damages against Department of Agriculture 
after it had unsuccessfully attempted to r.evoke or suspend the registration of plaintiff's 
company). 
47. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring); Butz, 438 U.S. at 504. 
48. Butz, 438 U.S. at 505 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
49. Butz 438 U.S. at 505. 
50. See infra notes 62 - 63 and accompanying text. 
51. See Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). 
52. [d. at 198. 
53. [d. at 201. 
54. [d. at 201-02. 
55. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (servicewoman claimed that 
Army regulation prohibiting the enlistment of a single parent with a dependent child 
8
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cuits have adopted the Mindes test, at least in part. 56 The Ninth 
Circuit first applied the Mindes test in 1978,57 but did not for-
mally adopt it until 1981 when it decided Wallace v. Chappell. 58 
In Chappell, five Navy enlisted men alleged that certain officers 
discriminated against them on the basis of race in making duty 
assignments and performance evaluations. 59 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the Mindes test should be applied to ascertain the re-
viewability of constitutional claims against the military, but ex-
pressed "no view as to whether the Mindes test should govern 
federal nonconstitutional claims."60 Applying the first prong of 
constituted sex discrimination and violated her equal protection rights). 
56. See e.g. Costner v. Oklahoma Army Nat'l Guard, 833 F.2d 905, 907 (10th Cir. 
1987) (per curiam) (member of state national guard claimed that he had been discrimi-
nated against on the basis of his age); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 
1987) (member of state national guard claimed that he had been discriminated against 
on the basis of his race), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 402 (1988); Williams v. Wilson, 762 F.2d 
357, 359 (4th Cir. 1985) (member of state national guard claimed that National Guard 
had violated its own procedural regulations regarding selective retention); Ogden v. 
United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1179 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1985) (Navy personnel claimed that 
their first amendment rights had been violated); Penagaricano v. Llenza, 747 F.2d 55, 60-
61 (1st Cir. 1984) (member of Air National Guard claimed that his discharge violated 
procedural due process); Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1982) (sergeant in 
Air Force Reserve claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his 
age), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Ct. Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 468 (D.C.Cir. 
1986) (former Army officer claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis 
of her sex); Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983) (member of Na-
tional guard claimed that his dismissal violated § 1983); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 
1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1976) (former servicewoman claimed that Marine Corps.' policy man-
dating discharge for pregnancy violated her rights to equal protection and due process). 
57. Schlanger v. United States, 586 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978) (former Air Force enlis-
tee challenged his removal from the Airman's Education and Commissioning Program 
and his reassignment elsewhere), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). 
58. 661 F.2d 729, 733 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (Navy enlisted men brought race discrimi-
nation action against superior officers), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
59. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 730. 
60. Id. at 733 n. 4. Dicta in most Ninth Circuit cases following Chappell, including 
Watkins I, implies that an internal military decision is reviewable only when the plain-
tiff alleges a constitutional, statutory or regulatory violation. See Christoffersen v. Wash-
ington State Air National Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1988) (former national 
guardsmen claimed that the Guard's decision not to retain them violated their first 
amendment rights); Sandidge v. State of Washington, 813 F.2d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(National Guard officer sought revision of job performance evaluation that allegedly vio-
lated his constitutional right to free association); Sebra V. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1141 
(9th Cir. 1986) (member of California National Guard claimed that his transfer violated 
his due process and first amendment rights and that it also violated § 1983 and the 
National Guard's own regulations); Khalsa V. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 
1985) (member of Sikh religion claimed that Army appearance regulations violated his 
first amendment rights) reaff'd 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Gonzalez V. De-
partment of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 929 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (serviceman claimed that 
Army had subjected him to race discrimination) ("[wle limited our adoption of the 
9
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the Mindes test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs 
had alleged a Bivens-type claim to recover damages from a supe-
rior officer for alleged constitutional violations and remanded 
the case to the district court for consideration of the second 
prong of Mindes. 61 
Without overruling Mindes, the Supreme Court reversed,62 
on the grounds that Feres precludes enlisted military personnel 
from maintaining any kind of damages claim against military of-
ficials that is not authorized by a specific statute, even if the 
claim is based on an alleged constitutional violation.63 Since 
Chappell, circuit courts have applied the Mindes test to the two 
types of claims that Chappell does not expressly foreclose: (1) 
claims seeking strictly injunctive or declaratory relief against 
military officials,6. and (2) damages claims against military offi-
cials based upon an explicit statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 
§ 1985(3).611 
Mindes analysis to 'cases in which the plaintiff has alleged [a violation of] a 'recognized' 
constitutional right' "). 
61. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 737-38. 
62. The Court in Chappell noted that service members are not precluded from ob-
taining any relief whatsoever for constitutional violations, citing to three cases which 
involved injunctive or declaratory relief. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The 
Court subsequently acknowledged that these citations "referred to redress designed to 
halt or prevent the constitutional violation rather than the award of money damages." 
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (member of Army brought suit under 
Federal Torts Claim Act after Army secretly administered four doses of LSD to him 
thereby causing severe personality changes that led to his discharge and the dissolution 
of his marriage). 
63. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). In fact, the Court noted that "[ilt is 
clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary con-
trol over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establish-
ment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline." [d. 
at 301. 
64. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985) (Chappell does 
not preclude an equitable remedy). 
65. See Christoffersen v. Washington State Air Nat'l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1441 
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Chappell's rationale leaves the field open for Congress to 
enact legislation authorizing servicemen's constitutional damages claims against their 
superiors, but declining to decide whether Chappell bars any or all § 1983 claims for 
alleged civil rights violations by military personnel). See also Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that Chappell merely rejected an implied damages rem-
edy but, nonetheless, holding that plaintiff's expressly authorized § 1985(a) remedy was 
properly dismissed because such liability would conflict with Chappell's underlying ra-
tionale), cert. denied. 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). See also Miller v. Newbauer. 862 F.2d 771, 
775 (9th Cir. 1988) (leaving open the question of whether Chappell is inconsistent with a 
damages suit pursuant to § 1985(3». 
Other circuits have concluded that Chappell's reasoning is inconsistent with a dam-
10
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2. The Wagner Test 
In United States v. Lazy FC Ranch,66 the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that "[n]o fewer than eight circuits ... have stated 
that there are some circumstances in which the Government will 
be estopped . . .", and that estoppel should be applied against 
the government "where justice and fair play require it."67 In La-
vin v. Marsh,68 three years after it first applied the Mindes 
test,69 the Ninth Circuit resolved an estoppel claim against the 
Secretary of the Army according to principles governing estoppel 
against the government.70 Similarly, in Jablon v. United 
States,71 the Ninth Circuit analyzed an estoppel claim against 
the Air Force according to principles governing estoppel against 
the government.72 Dicta in Helm v. State of California,73 sum-
ages action under § 1983 against state National Guard officials. See Jorden v. National 
Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 108 (3d. Cir. 1986) (former National Guard member claimed 
that his various supervisors had engaged in a conspiracy to harass him and to discharge 
him on the basis of race and in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights), 
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 66 (1987); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 366-67 (8th Cir. 
1984) (black national guardsman's mother sued United States, the guardsman's superior 
officers and the participants in a mock lynching incident involving her son), cert. denied, 
473 U.S. 904 (1985); Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1984) (Na-
tional Guard member sought relief from his termination as a technician), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1135 (1985). 
66. 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973) (United States sued agriculture partnership to re-
cover certain money paid to it under soil bank program). 
67. [d. at 988-89. Later, in Saulque, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that the gov-
ernment may be estopped only when it is acting in its proprietary capacity and not when 
it is acting in its sovereign capacity. Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 
1981) (Paiute Indian challenged Bureau of Indian Affairs' denial of his application for 
Indian allotment of land). That dicta was rejected, however, in Johnson v. Williford, 682 
F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (prisoner, who was erroneously paroled, was entitled to equita-
bly estop the government from revoking his release). In Johnson, the court held that the 
government could be estopped even when it is acting in its sovereign capacity if the 
effects would not unduly damage the public interest. [d. at 871 n.1 (emphasis added). 
68. 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981) (lieutenant colonel sued for injunctive relief to 
prevent mandatory removal from active service because of an age-based statutory years-
of-service limitation). 
69. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
70. Lavin, 644 F.2d at 1383-84. The court stated: U[wJhile the Army's acts which led 
to Lavin's mistaken belief may be labeled negligent, we do not find in the facts of this 
case the kind of affirmative misconduct which would justify the application of equitable 
estoppel." [d. at 1383. 
71. 657 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1981) (physician, who sold his medical practice and 
house in reliance on recruiter's promise that incentive pay for enlisting was payable upon 
physician's giving oath of office and not upon entry on active duty, was not entitled to 
equitably estop Army from revoking his active duty orders). 
72. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not rely on principles regarding 
11
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marily analyzed an equitable estoppel claim against the Army. 
In Helm, the Ninth Circuit held that an age discrimination 
claim against the Army was not justiciable even though it satis-
fied the -first prong of the Mindes test because "the special pol-
icy considerations involved in judicial review of military deci-
sionmaking" favored finding Helm's claims nonreviewable.74 It 
also held that Helm's equitable estoppel claim could not be 
raised for the first time on appeaPII In dicta, it stated that "even 
had the issue been presented below," it would have been pre-
cluded by Lavin v. Marsh.7s Thus, since its formal adoption of 
the Mindes test in 1981, Watkins is the first case that required 
the Ninth Circuit to analyze an equitable estoppel claim against 
the military. 
The United States Supreme Court has reversed several 
Ninth Circuit decisions invoking equitable estoppel against the 
government.77 In Heckler v. Community Health Services of 
Crawford County, Inc.,78 however, the Court declined to hold 
that "there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring 
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel 
might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in 
some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in 
their dealings with the Government."79 Rather, the majority 
held that "the Government may not be estopped on the same 
terms as any other litigant" because "[w]hen the Government is 
unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has 
equitable estoppel against the government because he was relying on a promissory estop· 
pel theory rather than an equitable estoppel theory. [d. at 1067·70. 
73. 722 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1983) (retired member of Army reserves sued for equita-
ble relief from alleged age discrimination that resulted in his not being granted a promo-
tion to grade of lieutenant colonel). 
74. [d. at 510. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1982) (per curiam) (INS delay in 
processing alien's spouse application for residency not grounds for invoking equitable 
estoppel against the INS); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5,94 (1973) (per curiam) (INS could not 
be equitably estopped from denying citizenship to Filipino war veteran); Montana v. 
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961) (government could not be equitably estopped from 
denying citizenship to the child of a United States citizen born abroad even though the 
child's mother relied on the advice of a United States government official who incorrectly 
told her that she could return to the United States to deliver her baby). 
78. 467 U.S. 51 (1984) (government sought to recover overpayments it had made to 
provider of home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries). 
79. [d. at 60-61 (emphasis in original). 
12
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given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole 
in obedience to the rule of law is undermined."so 
In Wagner u. Director, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency,S1 the Ninth Circuit clarified its approach to cases where 
the plaintiff seeks to invoke equitable estoppel against the gov-
ernment. The court held that "[a] party seeking to raise estoppel 
against the goverment must establish 'affirmative misconduct 
going beyond mere negligence'; even then, 'estoppel will only ap-
ply where the government's wrongful act will cause a serious in-
justice, and the public's interest will not suffer undue damage by 
imposition of the liability.' "S2 
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
1. Reviewability of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim 
Noting that it would be "fruitless" for Watkins to pursue 
further intraservice remedies,s3 the majority opinion began by 
determining that Watkins had exhausted all "effective" intraser-
vice remedies. S. The majority then addressed the issue of 
whether Mindes bars all nonconstitutional claims against the 
military.8Ci 
The majority reasoned that if the Ninth Circuit extended 
the application of Mindes to bar non constitutional claims such 
as equitable estoppel, federal courts would be forced to decide 
cases against the military on the broadest possible (constitu-
tional) grounds rather than on the narrowest (nonconstitutional) 
grounds.88 Noting that "[t]he estoppel doctrine, like the Mindes 
test, addresses the concerns of comity, prudence and deference 
80. [d. at 60. 
81. 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988). 
82. [d. at 519 (quoting Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
83. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 705. The Army's position was that Watkins' admitted ho-
mosexuality is a non-waivable disqualification for reenlistment. [d. The majority opinion, 
written by Judge Pregerson, did not cite any authority or provide any explanation for 
beginning the analysis in this manner. [d. 
84. [d. (citing Southeast Alaska Conservation Counil, Inc. v. Watson, 697 F.2d 1305, 
1309 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where ad-
ministrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, [or] where pursuit of administra-
tive remedies would be a futile gesture .... ")). 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 706. 
13
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[to the military],"87 the majority determined that "where estop-
pel obtains, there is simply no need to apply the reviewability 
factors of the Mindes test."88 The majority concluded that "the 
Mindes doctrine should not be extended to bar equitable estop-
pel against the military."89 
2. Merits of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim 
a. Affirmative Misconduct 
The majority then proceeded to analyze Watkins' equitable 
estoppel claim according to Wagner, which requires that a plain-
tiff attempting to invoke equitable estoppel against the govern-
ment must establish that the government engaged in affirmative 
misconduct.90 Affirmative misconduct requires an affirmative 
misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact 
by a government agent9} acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.92 The majority ruled that the Army committed affirmative 
misconduct by representing, throughout Watkins' 14 year mili-
tary career, that Watkins was qualified for reenlistment93 The 
majority noted that the Army's conduct in this case was "readily 
distinguishable" from the Army's conduct in Lavin.94 




90. See supra notes 81 - 82 and accompanying text. 
91. See Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Ruby Co, 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978) (government brought action to quiet title 
to "omitted lands" which lay between meander lines established by two different govern-
ment surveys), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 
1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981). 
92. The government is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agents. See Saul-
que v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917». See also Federal Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill, 332 
U.S. 380 (1947) (wheat grower whose application for insurance on his wheat crop had 
been erroneously accepted by federal crop insurance agency sued to recover for loss on 
his reseeded acreage). 
93. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707. The majority also cited the district court's finding 
that the Army had "plainly acted affirmatively in [violation of its regulations by) admit-
ting, reclassifying, reenlisting, retaining, and promoting Watkins." [d. at 708. 
94. [d. In Lavin, the Ninth Circuit refused to estop the Army from denying an 
Army Reserve officer's entitlement to pension benefits because the Army's conduct "did 
not amount to a 'pervasive pattern of false promises' for which the government could be 
estopped." [d. (quoting Lavin, 664 F.2d at 1383). 
14
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that the alleged misconduct in question was performed by the 
unauthorized acts of its agents.911 The Army Secretary had not 
exceeded his authority each of the three times that he decided 
to reenlist Watkins. 98 
b. Balancing the Hardships 
According to Wagner, a plaintiff attempting to invoke equi-
table estoppel against the government must also establish that 
the balance of hardships tips in his favor. 97 The majority quoted 
the district court's analysis of the balance of interests in Wat-
kins' case: 
The injury to plaintiff from having relied on the 
Army's approval of his military career - and be-
ing denied it now - is the loss of his career. The 
harm to the public interest if reenlistment is not 
prevented is nonexistent. Plaintiff has demon-
strated that he is an excellent soldier. His contri-
bution to this Nation's security is of obvious ben-
efit to the public. Furthermore, when the 
government deals "carefully, honestly and fairly 
with its citizens," the public interest is likewise 
benefited.98 
The majority concluded the balance of hardships tipped in Wat-
kins' favor because the possibility of damage to the public inter-
est was still nonexistent.99 
95. [d. 
96. [d. The Army had previously argued that reenlistment was exclusively the func-
tion of the Army Secretary. [d. 
The majority also noted that an agent of the Army had "erased" the handwritten 
July 29, 1981 entry on Watkin's Reenlistment Data Card and had "forged" a new entry 
indicating that Watkins was ineligible for reenlistment due to his homsexuality. [d. at 
708 n.15. The erased entry, besides being legible, was also corroborated by an unrebutted 
affidavit from an Army sergeant. [d. The court deemed this circumstantial evidence of 
the Army's consciousness of misconduct and an attempt to conceal that misconduct from 
exposure. [d. The court did not indicate whether this evidence supported its conclusion 
that the Army had engaged in affirmative misconduct. [d. 
97. See Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979). 
See also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); Gestuvo v. District Director of 
INS, 337 F.Supp. 1093, 1102 (C.D.Cal. 1971) (estopping the INS from refusing to revali-
date approval of an immigrant's third preference classification). 
98. [d. (citing Watkins, 551 F.Supp. 212, 223 (W.D.Wash. 1982) (citation omitted)). 
99. [d. The court noted that the Army's most recent written evaluation of Watkins, 
completed during the course of this legal action, contained nothing but the highest 
praise, describing Watkins' duty performance as "outstanding in every regard" and his 
15
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c. Traditional Elements of Estoppel 
Finally, according to Wagner, a plaintiff attempting to in-
voke equitable estoppel against the government must also prove 
each of the traditional elements of equitable estoppel. According 
to United States v. Wharton,t°o traditional estoppel doctrine re-
quired Watkins to demonstrate that 1) the Army knew of its 
policy mandating disqualification of all homosexuals from reen-
listment; 2) the Army intended Watkins to rely on its waiver of 
the policy; 3) Watkins was ignorant of the policy; and 4) Wat-
kins was injured by his reliance on the Army's conduct.lol 
The majority observed that the Army had been aware of 
Watkins' homosexuality throughout his military careerl02 and 
concluded that the Army's argument that Deputy Chief of Staff 
for PersonneP03 was unaware of the contents of Watkins' per-
sonnel file was "patently absurd."lo" The majority found that 
the Army had intended that Watkins rely on its acceptances of 
his reenlistment applications and that Watkins reasonably be-
lieved that the Army had intended to reenlist him. The majority 
cited the district court findings that "[t]aken together, over a 
career spanning more than 14 years, those acts amounted to a 
policy of ignoring this service-member's homosexuality" and 
that "[a]s a matter of law, the court concludes that the second 
element of plaintiff's estoppel claim has been satisfied."loli The 
potential as "unlimited." [d. Furthermore, an Army review board had determined in 
1975 that "there was no evidence suggesting that [Watkins') behavior has had either a 
degrading effect upon unit performance, morale or discipline, or upon his own job per-
formance." [d. 
100. 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (United States brought action for ejectment of 
defendants from 40 acre parcel of government land). 
101. [d. at 412. "(I) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must 
intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the 
estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the 
true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury." [d. (quoting 
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970». 
102. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710. "For the Army to acknowledge that it is aware of 
plaintiff's homosexuality when it comes to conducting criminal investigations, holding 
discharge proceedings, and revoking security clearances, but maintain that it is ignorant 
when four enlistments are at issue, suggests bad faith." [d. (quoting Watkins, 551 
F.Supp. at 220). 
103. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is primarily responsible for Army 
reenlistment. [d. 
104. [d. (quoting Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 200). 
105. [d. (quoting Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 222). For further support, the majority 
16
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majority found that the Army's repeated waiver of its disqualifi-
cation policy made it "impossible" for the court to charge Wat-
kins with the knowledge that the disqualfication was, in fact, 
nonwaivable.l06 Finally, the majority observed that Watkins re-
lied on the Army's repeated waiver of its theoretically nonwaiv-
able policy to his detriment. l07 
The majority agreed with the district court's "thorough 
analysis of this question" and its conclusion that Watkins had 
sustained his burden of proving all of the traditional elements of 
estoppeP08 Accordingly, the majority held that "[t]his is a case 
where equity cries out and demands that the Army be estopped 
from refusing to reenlist W atkins on the basis of his 
homosexuality. "l09 
likened Watkins' claim to that of the prisoner in the Johnson case. Id. In Johnson, after 
eight adminstrative reviews, a prisoner was erroneously released on parole. Johnson v. 
Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982). The mistake was not discovered for 15 
months. Id. The court held that, as a matter of law, the prisoner had a right to believe 
that he would remain on parole during good behavior. Id. 
106. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710. Again, the majority likened Watkins' claim to that of 
the prisoner in the Johnson case. Id. In Johnson, the court held that, given the govern-
ment's continuing active misadvice regarding his eligibility for parole, the prisoner could 
not be charged with even constructive knowledge of the proper meaning of a parole stat-
ute. Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982). 
107. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710-711 (citing Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 223). The major-
ity stated that Watkins had: 
Id. 
developed skills necessary for military employment and re-
frained from developing skills suitable for civilian jobs. He 
worked more than 14 years toward a retirement benefit that 
he could have sought elsewhere. Had the Army refused plain-
tiff reenlistment in the past, plaintiff would not have lost the 
opportunity for civilian employment that would have brought 
him to a point of equivalent achievement. 
108. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 709. 
109. Id. at 711. Only part IV of the dissent expressed the view that Watkins' equita-
ble estoppel claim should fail on its merits. See id. at 737 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge 
Trott was the only judge who joined that part of the dissent. See id. at 739. The other 
judges who believed that Watkins should not prevail on his equitable estoppel claim did 
so on the ground that the estoppel claim was not reviewable. See id. at 711 (Norris, J., 
concurring). Judge Beezer concurred in parts I, II, III and the first paragraph of part V 
of the dissenting opinion. Chief Judge Goodwin concurred in parts I and III of the dis-
sent. See id. at 739. 
17
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C. CONCURRING OPINIONS 
1. Judge Norris' Concurring Opinion 
Judge Norris agreed with the majority's decision that the 
Army must reconsider Watkins' reenlistment application with-
out regard to his homosexuality.llo However, Judge Norris dis-
approved of the majority's decision to review Watkins' equitable 
estoppel claim.lll Judge Norris noted that the Supreme Court 
"has declined to approve the invocation of equitable estoppel 
against the government in cases where the facts are no less sym-
pathetic than the facts in Sgt. Watkins' case."1l2 Judge Norris 
also noted that, in the Heckler case, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed uncertainty as to whether equitable estoppel can ever be 
invoked against the goverment.llS Judge Norris concluded that 
Watkins' only justiciable non constitutional claim was a meritless 
claim that the Army's discharge and reenlistment regulations vi-
olate the Administrative Procedure Act. ll" 
Judge Norris also disapproved of the majority's refusal to 
analyze the merits of Watkins' claim that the Army's discharge 
and reenlistment regulations denied him (and other persons of 
homosexual orientation) equal protection.1lII Judge Norris reiter-
ated the painstaking analysis of the majority opinion in Watkins 
II, which had concluded that the Army's reenlistment regulation 
violates the equal protection clause by discriminating against 
persons of homosexual orientation, a suspect class, without pro-
moting a legitimate compelling government interest.1l6 
Judge Norris found that the Army's discharge and reenlist-
ment regulations discriminate against persons of homosexual 
orientation.l17 Judge Norris then determined that the Ninth Cir-
110. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711 (Norris, J., concurring in judgment). 
111. [d. "I agree with the dissent that the judgment cannot rest on the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel." [d. 
112. [d. (citing INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 
U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961)). 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 712. This claim lacked merit because Watkins had not alleged that the 
regulations were arbitrary or capricious on their face. [d. (emphasis added). Instead, 
Watkins had claimed only that the regulations were arbitrary as applied to him. [d. 
115. [d. at 711. 
116. Compare id. at 712-31 with Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1330-53. 
117. [d. at 712-16. Judge Norris found that "[tlhe regulations make any act or state-
18
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cuit had never issued a ruling on whether persons of homosexual 
orientation constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause.118 Judge Norris concluded that gays and lesbians consti-
tute a suspect class for equal protection purposes. ll9 Finally, 
Judge Norris urged that the Army's reenlistment regulations vi-
olate the Equal Protection Clause because they are not neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest.12o 
ment that might conceivably indicate a homosexual orientation evidence of homosexual-
ity; that evidence is is turn weighed against any evidence of a heterosexual orientation." 
[d. at 716. 
118. [d. at 716-24. Judge Norris distinguished this issue from the issue decided by 
the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (states may criminalize 
consensual homosexual sodomy because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not give gays and lesbians a fundamental right to engage in sodomy). 
[d. at 716-20. He also distinguished this issue from the issues decided by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in several other cases. [d. at 720-23. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 
1980) (Navy regulations providing for the discharge of personnel who engaged in homo-
sexual acts do not violate any substantive due process rights), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 
(1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1980) (Army's policy 
of prosecuting cases involving homosexual sodomy while refusing to prosecute cases in-
volving heterosexual sodomy did not unconstitutionally burden the exercise of an impor-
tant substantive right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment be-
cause the Army's policy bore a substantial relationship to an important government 
interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 
327 (9th Cir. 1979) (gays and lesbians do not have a right of action against private par-
ties who conspire to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws because the courts have not yet designated them a suspect or quasi-suspect class). 
Finally, Judge Norris explained why the Ninth Circuit should not summarily dismiss the 
issue on the ground that it would be anomalous to declare that state classifications based 
on sexual orientation deserve strict scrutiny when states are permitted to criminalize 
homosexual conduct. [d. at 723-24. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C.Cir. 1987) 
(FBI's policy of discriminating against practicing homosexuals in its hiring decisions 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
119. [d. at 724-28. Judge Norris noted that lesbians and gays have suffered a history 
of purposeful discrimination, that one's sexual orientation is irrelevant to the quality of 
one's contribution to society, that one's sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic 
because it is so central to one's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to 
penalize a person for refusing to change that characteristic and that lesbians and gays 
lack the political power necessary to obtain redress from the political branches of govern-
ment. [d. 
120. [d. at 728-31. Even granting special deference to the Army policy, Judge Norris 
found that Palmore foreclosed the Army from justifying its refusal to reenlist homosexu-
als on grounds that the presence of homosexuals would lead to tensions between soldiers, 
and to recruitment problems because many other members of the armed forces despise 
homosexuality. [d. at 728 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state could not 
grant custody of a white child to her father on ground that the child would likely suffer 
social stigmatization if she lived with her mother because her mother had remarried to a 
black man». Further, he found that Loving foreclosed the Army from arguing that its 
regulations are grounded in legitimate moral norms. [d. at 729-30 (citing Loving v. 
Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state could not outlaw marriages between whites and blacks 
even if it sincerely believed that miscegenation - the mixing of racial blood lines - was 
19
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2. Judge Canby's Concurring Opinion 
Judge Canby concurred wholeheartedly in the majority 
opinion.l2l He wrote separately, however, because he believed 
that the majority should have reached Watkins' equal protection 
claim even though its ruling on Watkins' equitable estoppel 
claim may have disposed of the case.122 
D. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
The dissenting opinion shared "the majority's admiration of 
Watkins' fine service to his country."123 The dissent, however, 
concluded that the majority had failed to heed "well-established 
case law which counsels against unnecessary judicial oversight of 
and intrusion into military matters."12. The dissent disagreed 
with all of the majority's reasons for refusing to apply Mindes. 
The dissent urged that Watkins' equitable estoppel claim failed 
to satisfy the first prong of the Mindes test in that it did not 
raise a federal constitutional, statutory or regulatory matter. m 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's application of the 
evil) ). 
Judge Norris also discounted the Army's argument that military discipline might be 
undermined if emotional relationships developed between homosexuals of different mili-
tary rank because the regulation at issue was poorly tailored to advance that interest. 
The regulation was grossly underinclusive in that did not address the problem of emo-
tional attachments between male and female personnel. It was also grossly overinclusive 
in that it disqualified all homosexuals whether or not they have developed any emotional 
or sexual relationships with other soldiers. [d. at 730. 
Finally, Judge Norris also rejected the Army's argument that its disqualification of 
all homosexuals is necessary to achieve its compelling interest in excluding persons who 
may be susceptible to blackmail. He found that the Army's regulations actually increase 
the risk of blackmail because they discourage servicemembers from declaring their ho-
mosexuality. Judge Norris argued that the Army would only achieve this compelling in-
terest if it adopted a regulation banning only those gays who had lied about or failed to 
admit their sexual orientation. Moreover, Judge Norris argued that treating homosexual-
ity as a nonwaivable disqualification from military service is not necessary to achieve this 
compelling interest for the same reasons that other serious potential sources of black-
mail, such as drug abuse and the commission of other serious military offenses, are 
treated as waivable disqualifications. [d. at 731. 
121. [d. (Canby, J., concurring). 
122. [d. "Because we are en bane, and the constitutional issue is a recurring one, I 
think I may appropriately reach it even though equitable estoppel may dispose of the 
case." [d. 
123. [d. at 731 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
124. [d. at 739. 
125. [d. at 732-33. 
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Wagner test, asserting that Watkins had not satisfied his burden 
of showing that the Army had engaged in affirmative misconduct 
or that the balance of hardships tipped in his favor. 126 Further-
more, the dissent also disagreed with the majority's analysis of 
the merits of Watkins' equitable estoppel claim, finding that 
Watkins failed to establish the reasonableness of his reliance on 
the Army's conduct.127 
1. Reviewability of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim 
The dissent began by urging that Feres and its progeny es-
tablish a "military discipline rationale" which emphasizes that 
"all suits by active military personnel against the government 
they serve have the potential to undermine [military effective-
ness]."128 The dissent noted that in Chappell the Supreme 
Court "relied upon Feres' military discipline rationale to con-
clude that enlisted military personnel cannot maintain a Bivens 
suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged consti-
tutional violations" and established that Congress has plenary 
control over remedies against the military establishment.129 The 
dissent also noted that Mindes "itself arose solely in the context 
of a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in connection 
with plaintiff's forced separation from active duty."13o Reading 
Feres, Mindes and Chappell together, the dissent urged that al-
though suits for injunctive relief are inherently less intrusive 
than suits for damages, "not all injunctive suits are equally well-
taken."13l In analyzing the justiciability of a suit for injunctive 
relief against the military, the dissent argued that the military 
discipline rationale requires federal courts to balance the mili-
tary establishment's need for protection from judicial intrusion 
against the importance of the plaintiff's rights at stake.132 Not-
ing that only the vindication of federal interests outweighs the 
qualified immunity given to federal executive officials,133 permits 
126. ld. 737-38. 
127. ld. at 739. 
128. ld. at 733 (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 40 - 43 and accompany-
ing text. 
129. ld. See also supra notes 59 - 65 and accompanying text. 
130. ld. at 735. See also supra notes 50 - 54 and accompanying text. 
131. ld. 
132. ld. 
133. See supra notes 44 - 49 and accompanying text. 
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federal courts to grant equitable relief in nondiversity suits,134 
and permits federal courts to review claims against state of-
ficers,m the dissent analogized that only the possible vindication 
of federal interests should permit federal courts to review claims 
for equitable relief against the military.lsB The dissent concluded 
that Mindes governs the reviewability of all claims against the 
military not directly precluded by the Supreme Court's Chap-
pell decision because it "insures that judicial intrusions into mil-
itary matters are limited to the vindication of federal 
interests. "137 
The dissent urged that the majority failed "to marshal any 
case law in support of its holding that a common law estoppel 
claim is justiciable against the military."138 The dissent found 
that the majority interpreted the Chappell case completely out 
of context by quoting Chappell as expressing no view as to 
whether the Mindes test should govern federal nonconstitutional 
claims. ISS The dissent urged that the majority had dispensed 
134. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 735 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring». 
135. The dissent noted that the Supreme Court declined to erect the Eleventh 
Amendment as a complete bar to federal court jurisdiction of claims alleging unconstitu-
tional conduct by a state actor. [d. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908». See also 
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (the Young doc-
trine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights); Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) ("Young's applicability has been tailored. to conform as pre-
cisely as possible to those specific situations in which it is 'necessary to permit the fed-
eral courts to vindicate federal rights' and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme 
authority of the United States''') (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105). 
136. [d. at 735-36. 
137. [d. at 736. According to the dissent, the majority's conclusion that Wagner suf-
ficiently "addresses the concerns of comity, prudence and deference [to the military]" 
and its "prediction that the United States military generally will be successful in estop-
pel suits does not carry the day." [d. at 736. The dissent noted that "[I]itigation is inher-
ently disruptive, and entails the risk of 'erroneous judicial conclusions (which would be-
cloud military decision-making),' " [d. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 
(1987». As the Supreme Court aptly noted in Stanley and Johnson, the mere pendency 
of a lawsuit against the government has an adverse impact on military discipline in the 
broadest sense of the word. [d. Moreover, "[I]itigation has certain crucial costs, [which] 
include the expenses of litigation, [and] the diversion of official energy from pressing 
public issues." [d. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982». 
138. [d. 
139. [d. at 736-37 (citing Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 733 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1981), 
rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983». The court in Chappell clearly indicated 
that "the [plaintiff's] allegations must amount to more than a traditional state law 
claim" to avoid the adverse impact that unnecessary judicial review of military matters 
would have on military discipline. [d. at 736-37 (citing Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 
733 n. 4,734 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983». "[A]II our cases 
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with "well-established case law" in its desire to avoid the diffi-
cult equal protection question presented in this case. l4O 
2. Merits of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim 
a. Affirmative Misconduct 
The dissent urged that the majority had failed "to give gen-
uine substance to [the] requirement that the Army's conduct 
amounted to affirmative misconduct."l41 The dissent argued that 
the Army's prior practice of excusing Watkins' homosexuality, 
despite regulations precluding his reenlistment, created, at most, 
an inference that the Army would overlook the regulation as to a 
particular enlistment period. HZ 
b. Balance of Hardships 
The dissent urged that the majority attempted to finesse 
the issue of whether "the public's interest will not suffer undue 
damage by imposition of the liability"l43 by baldly stating that 
the "harm to the public interest if reenlistment is not prevented 
following Chappell" lend further support to this interpretation of Chappell, in that they 
all "have insisted that the plaintiff's claims allege a federal constitutional, statutory, or 
regulatory violation." Id. at 736. 
140. Id. at 737. The dissent urged that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitu-
tional decisions does not, as the majority suggested, compel or persuade the court to 
refrain from applying the Mindes test to Watkins' equitable estoppel claim even though 
that would result in having to address the merits of his constitutional claim; the Su-
preme Court has held that such policy considerations "cannot override the constitutional 
limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary." See Pennhurst State School & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121-23 (1984). 
141. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 738. Although there is not a clear definition of "affirma-
tive misconduct," the Supreme Court's reversals of several Ninth Circuit decisions invok-
ing equitable estoppel against the government and the Supreme Court's rationale for 
imposing the additional requirement illustrate that affirmative misconduct occurs only in 
the most extraordinary circumstances. Id. 
142. Id. "Such apparent acquiescence or ambivalence does not meet the threshhold 
level of misfeasance needed to trigger equitable estoppel against the military" Id. The 
Lauin case demonstrated that "even ... a direct misrepresentation can fail to constitute 
affirmative misconduct." Id. (citing Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981». In 
Lauin, Army Reserve Recruiters had induced the plaintiff into joining the Army Reserve 
by representing that he could earn pension benefits after a specified number of years. Id. 
The Army's years of service regulation mandated the plaintiff's removal before he could 
earn the pension benefits that he had been promised. Id. The court did not estop the 
Army from enforcing its years of service regulation. Id. 
143. Id. at 739 (quoting Wagner v. Director, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1988». 
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is nonexistent ... [because] [p]laintiff has demonstrated that he 
is an excellent soldier."!" The dissent stressed that the majority 
simply has no authority to substitute its own assessment of Wat-
kins' impact on military matters for the Army's assessment that 
having homosexual soldiers, even good ones like Watkins, inter-
feres with its mission. 14ll Furthermore, the dissent asserted that 
the majority greatly minimized the probable damage to the pub-
lic interest by failing to consider the ramifications of its holding 
if other homosexuals besides Watkins invoked equitable estop-
pel against the Army.l46 
c. Traditional Elements of Estoppel 
Finally, the dissent urged that Watkins did not prove that 
he acted reasonably in believing that the Army had intended to 
excuse his homosexuality, despite regulations precluding his 
reenlistment.147 The dissent concluded that Watkins simply was 
not justified in assuming that the Army's decision to accept a 
particular application for reenlistment would ensure such ac-
ceptance for all time.148 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The panel of judges in Watkins addressed whether common 
law equitable estoppel claims against the military are justiciable 
and whether the military may be equitably estopped on the 
same principles as any other federal agency. These issues had 
never before been discussed at length by the Ninth Circuit or 
any other federal court, including the Fifth Circuit when it ar-
ticulated the Mindes test. l49 Any statements in Wallace and its 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 739. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. The dissent cited the Lavin case for the proposition that Watkins is 
charged with the knowledge that executive officials have the prerogative of implementing 
new programs and policies. so long as they do not run afoul of statutory or constitutional 
provisions. Id. 
149. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The dissent's argument that Mindes 
itself arose in the context of a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in connection 
with plaintiff's forced separation from active duty is misleading. The plaintiff in Mindes 
did not assert equitable estoppel against the Air Force; he instead asserted that his dis-
missal had violated due process. Id. 
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progeny regarding these issues are merely dicta because none of 
those cases involved an equitable estoppel claim against the mil-
itary.lllO Likewise, in Lavin, Helm and Jablon, the Ninth Circuit 
cannot be said to have implicitly rejected the argument that 
Mindes bars such claims because the military did not raise the 
justiciability issue as a defense and the court did not discuss it 
in any of those cases.1II1 Further, the fact that no court has ever 
decided the justiciability of common law equitable estoppel 
claims against the military is not a ground for ruling that such 
claims are not justiciable. Therefore, the majority in Watkins 
cannot be criticized for finding that the Ninth Circuit's adoption 
of the Mindes test did not require it to rule that Watkins' equi-
table estoppel against the Army was nonjusticiable. 
The majority's test for analyzing the merits of common law 
equitable estoppel claims against the military requires plaintiffs 
to demonstrate that 1) they have exhausted all effective in-
straservice remedies; (2) the military, via authorized acts of its 
agents, engaged in affirmative misconduct going beyond mere 
negligence; 3) the injustice done to the plaintiff outweighs the 
harm that will be done to the public interest if the military is 
estopped; and 4) all the traditional elements of estoppel are pre-
sent.11l2 This test does not abandon the concept of justiciability; 
instead it "intertwine[s] the concept of justiciability with the 
standards to be applied to the merits of the case. "1113 The first 
three elements of the majority's test provide grounds upon 
which a federal court can summarily reject an equitable estoppel 
claim against the military and are very similar to elements of the 
Mindes test. The third element is a flexible one that gives the 
military more deference than other federal agencieslll4 by requir-
150. See supra notes 57 - 60 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 68 - 76 and accompanying text. Helm is the strongest case in 
favor of the argument that the Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected the argument that its 
adoption of Mindes bars it from addressing federal nonconstitutional claims against the 
military because that case arose after the Ninth Circuit had formally adopted the 
Mindes test and also because after rejecting the plaintiff's constitutional claim on jus-
ticiability grounds, the court, in dicta stated that, were the estoppel claim properly 
before it, it would reject it on the merits. This argument, however, is not very persuasive 
because the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the estoppel claim was merely dicta and it is clear 
that the court had treated the estoppel issue very summarily. 
152. See supra notes 83 - 101. 
153. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Mindes 
analysis). 
154. It is well established that federal courts are required to give the military agen-
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ing the court to consider the military's special need for protec-
tion from intrusion into its affairs. Thus, the test developed by 
the majority in Watkins cannot be criticized for failing to give 
appropriate comity, prudence and deference to the military. 
The majority opinion probably will not be readily accepted 
by other circuits. lllll The majority opinion invites debate about 
whether its new test should be used to analyze all equitable es-
toppel claims against the military or only those claims that are 
coupled with a constitutional claim.11l6 More importantly, it 
opens up speculation about the possible ramifications of the 
court's holding. In analyzing the balance of hardships element, 
the majority did not consider the possibility that there may be 
dozens or even hundreds of other openly gay and lesbian mem-
bers of the military who might also attempt to invoke equitable 
estoppel against the military should they ever be denied reen-
listment on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
In a related omission, the majority does not discuss whether 
the military can ever radically change a policy or regulation such 
as the one at issue. The majority must have believed that the 
facts in the Watkins case were extraordinary and unlikely to re-
cur and, for that reason, unlikely to have much impact on the 
military. The majority would probably reject a similar claim 
from a servicemember who had not always been as candid about 
his sexual orientation or who had not invested as much time in 
military service, or who had not always received such outstand-
ing performance evaluations or whom the military could prove 
had actually committed illegal sexual conduct. 
As a majority of justices pointed out, the court in Watkins 
should have issued a ruling on Watkins' constitutional claim.11l7 
cies more deference than other federal agencies. See supra notes 40 - 65 and accompany-
ing text. 
155. The Seventh Circuit has already stated that "we find the Ninth Circuit's estop-
pel application doubtful." See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(lesbian Army reserve sergeant who was barred from reenlistment claimed that Army 
regulation making homosexual status a nonwaivable disqualification for service violated 
her first and fifth amendment rights to free expression and equal protection). 
156. The majority noted that by deciding the case on narrow equitable grounds it 
could avoid a decision on broad constitutional grounds. See supra notes 85 - 89 and 
accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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This claim necessitated a holding on the recurring constitutional 
issue of the proper review of government classifications based on 
sexual orientation. By avoiding this issue and deciding the case 
on estoppel grounds, the majority in Watkins has necessitated 
piecemeal litigation and further disruption of military affairs. IllS 
Although Judge Norris's concurring opinion addresses this issue 
and will likely be of great value to other circuits,11l9 a majority 
opinion would have been much more beneficial to the Army and 
gays and lesbians because it would have brought us much closer 
to having the issue finally resolved by the United States Su-
preme Court. 
John Glenn Karris* 
158. At the time that the court in Watkins avoided determining the constitutional 
issue of the proper level of scrutiny of government classifications based on sexual orien-
tation, the issue was pending in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits. See High Tech 
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 90 D.A.R. 1373 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(class of gay applicants for security clearances claimed that policy of subjecting gays to 
expanded investigations and mandatory adjudications violated their fifth amendment 
equal protection rights); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). 
159. In Ben-Shalom, the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of Judge Norris's 
concurring opinion and agreed with Judge Hall's dissent. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 
F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990. 
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